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The high incidence of temporary agency employment among participants in government 
employment programs has catalyzed debate about whether these jobs help the poor transition 
into stable employment and out of poverty. We provide direct evidence on this question through 
analysis of a Michigan welfare-to-work program in which program participants were randomly 
allocated across service providers (‘contractors’) with different job placement practices.  We 
draw on a telephone survey of contractors and on administrative program data linked with wage 
records data on all participants entering the program over a three-and-a half-year period. Our 
survey evidence documents a consensus among contractors that temporary help jobs are 
generally easier for those with weak skills and experience to obtain, but no consensus on whether 
temporary help jobs confer long-term benefits to participants.  Our analysis of the quasi-
experimental data introduced in Autor and Houseman (2005) shows that placing participants in 
either temporary or direct-hire jobs improves their odds of leaving welfare and escaping poverty 
in the short term. However, we find that only direct-hire placements help reduce welfare 
dependency over longer time horizons.  Our findings raise questions about the incentive structure 
of many government employment programs that emphasize rapid placement of program 
participants into jobs and that may inadvertently encourage high placement rates with temporary 
help agencies.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
One in eight Americans and one in five children under the age of six lived in poverty in 
2003, according to official U.S. Census Bureau statistics.  Poverty is strongly associated with 
lack of full-time, year-round employment.  Government programs such as welfare-to-work and 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) try to help the poor find stable employment and thereby 
escape poverty.  As one strategy to facilitate such transitions, several researchers have recently 
proposed the use of temporary agencies as labor market intermediaries for the poor (Holzer 
2004; Andersson et al. 2005, and Lane et al. 2003).  Drawing on a unique policy quasi-
experiment from a large welfare-to-work program, we provide new, direct evidence on whether 
temporary agency jobs help low-skilled workers escape poverty. 
A large minority of participants in government employment programs already work in the 
temporary help sector.  In our data on participants in a welfare-to-work program, 21 percent who 
found jobs worked for temporary agencies.  Similarly high levels of temporary help 
employment—ranging from 15 to 40 percent—have been found in other studies of government 
employment programs (Autor and Houseman 2002).  These figures are especially striking in 
light of the fact that temporary agency employment accounts for only 2 to 3 percent of daily 
employment in the United States. 
The high incidence of temporary agency employment among participants in government 
programs has sparked debate about whether temporary agency jobs help the poor transition into 
stable employment and out of poverty or instead harm their long-term labor market outcomes.  
Those favoring an expanded role for temporary help agencies cite evidence that some agencies 
provide valuable skills training, that many employers screen workers for permanent positions 
through agencies, and that these agencies may provide an important port-of-entry for low-skilled   2
workers (Abraham 1988; Houseman 2001; Autor 2001, 2003; and Kalleberg et al. 2003).  Those 
skeptical of an expanded role for temporary agencies tend to view most agency jobs as dead-end 
jobs, providing little in the way of valuable work experience, training, or opportunity for career 
advancement.   
Both of these scenarios could be correct.  In some situations, companies may use 
temporary agencies to screen individuals for permanent jobs with good pay, benefits, and career 
ladders.  In these circumstances, temporary agencies may provide access for workers to good 
jobs.  In other situations, companies may utilize temporary agencies to staff short-term positions 
requiring few skills and providing few chances for promotion.  What matters for policy is which 
scenario dominates in the low-skilled markets targeted by government programs. 
Our study, based on a quasi-experiment in a Michigan welfare-to-work program in one 
city, provides direct evidence on this policy question.  Program participants were, in effect, 
randomly assigned among service providers (termed “contractors”).  Our analysis draws on data 
from a survey of contractors and on administrative data linked with wage records data on all 
participants entering the program over a three and a half year period.   
Our survey provides a detailed picture of how temporary agencies are utilized as labor 
market intermediaries in poor neighborhoods.  It also documents considerable variation among 
contractors in their assessments of the consequences of temporary agency placements.  
Contractors with more favorable views of temporary agencies provide participants with more 
contact with temporary agency jobs and have higher placement rates in these positions than do 
contractors with less favorable views of agencies. 
Using Michigan administrative welfare-to-work and wage records data, we exploit 
variation across contractors in the probability that statistically identical program participants will   3
be placed into a temporary agency, direct-hire, or no job to identify the labor market 
consequences of temporary agency placements. We focus on whether, relative to a direct-hire or 
no job placement, temporary agency placements help participants achieve earnings sufficient to 
leave welfare and escape poverty.   
We find that placing a participant in either a temporary or a direct-hire job improves her 
chances of leaving welfare and escaping poverty in the short term, defined as one quarter 
following the quarter of program entry.  Over a one to two year time horizon, however, only 
direct-hire placements confer any labor market benefit.  Over these longer horizons, having been 
placed in a temporary agency job makes a participant no better off—and possibly worse off—
than not having received any job placement. Our findings contradict conclusions drawn by 
several previous studies and do not support policy recommendations to expand the use of 
temporary agencies in employment and poverty-reduction programs.   
The remainder of the chapter describes the Michigan welfare-to-work program, termed 
“Work First,” and the data; analyzes our survey data; and describes our methodology and 
econometric results from our administrative data.  In the conclusion, we discuss plausible 
explanations for why we find no long-term benefit of temporary agency placements and consider 
the implications of our findings for policy.   
II.  The Work First Program in Michigan 
A principal objective of the 1996 welfare reform legislation (the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA) was to encourage welfare recipients to 
obtain jobs rapidly.  The premise of welfare reform was that recipients could find stable 
employment and escape poverty and welfare dependency, given proper incentives and assistance 
in finding jobs.  Pursuant to federal regulation, states generally require that those on welfare   4
work as a condition of benefits receipt.  Most states, including Michigan, have implemented a 
“Work First” strategy, in which applicants for TANF assistance who do not meet mandatory 
work requirements must participate in programs that help them find employment.   
As the name implies, Work First programs emphasize job search assistance and rapid 
placement into employment.  Currently, Michigan requires most TANF recipients to work 40 
hours per week to remain eligible for assistance.
1  Work First participants, likewise, are required 
to treat the program like a job and engage in program activities or search for employment for 40 
hours per week until they are successful.  Individuals who fail to comply with program 
requirements are terminated from Work First and face sanctions and, ultimately, the termination 
of TANF benefits.   
A unique aspect of the city we study is its effective random assignment of Work First 
participants to Work First providers.  The city is divided into geographic districts for the purpose 
of administering TANF and Work First programs.  A state agency, the Family Independence 
Agency, determines welfare eligibility and administers TANF benefits.  A city agency 
administers the Work First program, but the provision of services is contracted out.  Currently, 
over 30 contractors, all nonprofit or public sector entities, provide Work First services.  
Individuals apply for TANF benefits to the Family Independence Agency servicing the district in 
which they reside.  If applicants are deemed eligible for benefits but do not meet work 
requirements, they must enroll within two weeks in a Work First program run by a contractor 
operating in their district.  In most districts, two or three contractors operate programs.  In these 
districts, contractors take turns enrolling Work First participants.  Using multiple comparison 
tests of participant characteristics across contractors operating in the same districts, we 
                                                 
1 An individual may work 40 hours per week and still be eligible for TANF if her earnings are lower than a 
specified threshold, as determined by her family size.     5
demonstrate that within almost all districts with two or more contractors (and within all districts 
included in our analysis sample), the assignment of participants to contractors is functionally 
equivalent to random assignment (Autor and Houseman 2005).  
The Work First program structure and set of services is largely standardized among 
contractors.  Contractors typically spend one week—40 hours—providing new participants with 
basic job search skills and strategies, such as skills assessment and employability planning, 
resume writing, interviewing and self-presentation skills, and job readiness and life-skills 
training.  Except for “tech-prep” courses, which quickly review skills that might be tested on an 
employment application, little in the way of remedial, vocational, or computer skills training is 
provided.  The availability of more intensive training is quite limited, and such courses are 
provided outside the Work First system to all eligible participants. 
Following the first week, participants are expected to look for work full time until they 
are successful at finding it.  At this stage, contractors play an integral role in placing participants 
into jobs.  Virtually all of the contractors provide individual job search assistance, refer 
participants to jobs with specific employers, accompany participants to job fairs, bring employers 
on-site to recruit participants, and sponsor group job search assistance programs such as job 
clubs.   
Once participants find suitable jobs, contractors are required to follow-up with 
participants and their employers on a monthly basis until the participant achieves earnings 
sufficient to close her TANF case, or until the participant is terminated from the program for 
other reasons.
2  Contractors check on employment status and collect information on participants’ 
                                                 
2 Even if a participant’s TANF case has been closed due to earnings, the contractor must conduct a 90-day 
follow-up.  Typically, if a participant’s case is not closed due to earnings, her Work First spell is terminated because 
of non-compliance with the program.  The median Work First spell in our sample is slightly under three months.  
Ninety-six percent are terminated from the program in less than a year.     6
wages and hours worked.  This information determines whether a participant is still eligible for 
TANF benefits.  Work First providers’ contracts with the city are written for a one-year period.  
The city evaluates contractors based on the fraction of participants who get jobs and on the 90-
day retention rate at those jobs.  
III.  Data 
We draw upon two types of evidence to frame and test hypotheses about the effects of 
temporary agency employment on low-skilled workers.  The first is a telephone survey of Work 
First contractors operating in our city.  The second is administrative and earnings data on Work 
First participants who entered the program over a three and a half year period from 1999 to 2003.  
From these data, we utilize a sample that includes over 36,000 Work First spells and covers nine 
geographic districts in which 25 contractors operated programs.   
Telephone Survey  
We developed a survey instrument based on extensive in-person interviews with several 
contractors, and then pre-tested the telephone survey with another contractor.  Of the 25 
contractors in our sample, we completed surveys, lasting about 30 minutes, with 21; we were 
unable to contact two contractors, and two contractors no longer operated Work First programs.  
All telephone surveys were conducted between the Fall of 2004 and the Spring of 2005, a year 
and a half to two years following the last cohort of Work First participants represented in our 
administrative data.    Because the survey included several open-ended questions, all surveys 
were tape recorded and transcribed.  We interviewed the person heading the Work First program 
in each organization.   
Part of the survey asked questions about the basic structure of the Work First program 
and the services provided.  These questions were designed to uncover any differences across   7
contractors in resources or program services that might impact outcomes of participants.  As 
noted above, we found that the program structure and services provided are virtually identical 
across contractors. 
Most questions focused on temporary agency jobs and agencies’ role in welfare-to-work 
transitions.  We asked a series of questions about the contractor’s policies towards working with 
temporary agencies to place participants into jobs, their assessments of the characteristics of 
temporary compared to direct-hire jobs, and their views on the long-term consequences of 
temporary agency employment for Work First clients.  We also asked contractors a series of 
questions designed to help us better understand the types of temporary agencies operating in the 
labor market and whether and why they worked with particular agencies.  Finally, we asked 
several questions about how participants with low-skills and poor work histories fared in 
temporary agency jobs as compared to those with relatively good skills and work histories.
3   
Administrative Data 
We analyze administrative data on all Work First participants who entered the program 
from the fourth quarter of 1999 through the second quarter of 2003.  These data include the 
participants’ geographic district, the contractor to which each is assigned, and basic demographic 
information, such as race, age, gender, and educational attainment.  These administrative data do 
not include information on family size or age of children.  The unit of observation is a Work 
First spell, and some individuals have repeat spells.  The 36,105 Work First spells represented in 
our data come from 23,746 participants.   
                                                 
3 A copy of the survey instrument is available from the authors.   8
Unlike previous studies of welfare-to-work transitions, our data provide detailed 
information on the jobs obtained through the welfare-to-work program.
4  This information 
includes hourly wages, weekly hours, job title, and the name of the employer for up to six jobs 
obtained during a Work First spell.  We coded the job titles into occupational classifications and 
used the employer name to identify whether the job was held with a temporary agency or not.  
With respect to the latter, we utilized three comprehensive lists of temporary agencies operating 
in our metropolitan area at various points in time represented by our data.
5   
IV.  The Role of Temporary Agencies in Welfare-to-Work Transitions: The Views of 
Service Providers 
 
The telephone survey served several purposes.  The first was to better understand how 
contractors place participants into jobs and the mechanisms by which they encourage or 
discourage placement with temporary agencies.  The second was to document the range of 
policies and practices regarding temporary agency placements and any consensus or 
disagreement about the consequences of agency placements.  The third was to solicit opinions 
about the potentially varying impacts of temporary agency employment.  
The Role of Contractors in Job Placements 
Contractors play an integral role in placing Work First participants into jobs.  For 
participants who found jobs while in the program, respondents were asked to estimate what 
fraction found jobs on their own and what fraction they directly helped through referrals, on-site 
employer visits, and the like.  Half of all respondents indicated they were directly involved in 75 
percent or more of job placements, and all but three respondents (15 percent) took credit for 
                                                 
4 An exception is Corcoran and Chen (2004), in which data on jobs come from interviews with welfare 
recipients.   
5 Particularly helpful was a list supplied by David Fasenfest and Heidi Gottfried from their study mapping 
the location of all temporary agencies in this metropolitan area. In a small number of cases the correct classification 
of an employer was unclear based on name alone, but we generally were able to determine the nature of an 
employer’s operation through an Internet search or by contacting the employer by phone.    9
more than 50 percent of the jobs obtained in their program.  Even if these estimates are inflated, 
they suggest that a large majority of contractors play a significant role in determining whether 
participants obtain jobs and, by implication, where they obtain jobs. 
Seventeen of the 21 contractors provided an estimate of the fraction of employed 
participants obtaining work through temporary agencies.  While the median response was 15 
percent, there was large variation in reported estimates, with three contractors reporting that 5 
percent or less of their job placements were with temporary agencies and three reporting that 
placements with agencies accounted for a quarter, a third, and even three-fourths of all 
placements.
 6   
Table 1 reports the frequency with which contractors invite temporary help agencies to 
speak with or recruit participants at their Work First site and the frequency with which 
contractors refer participants to temporary agencies for jobs.  What is most striking is the 
variation in the amount of contact with temporary help agencies that contractors provide their 
participants, especially in regard to referrals for specific jobs.  Whereas five contractors (24 
percent) report referring clients to temporary help jobs on a weekly basis, eight (38 percent) 
report making such referrals only sporadically or never.   
If, as they report, contractors heavily influence the jobs that participants take, and if 
contractors vary substantially in the amount of exposure they provide participants to temporary 
agency jobs, then we should observe an association between the amount of contact with 
temporary agencies and the placement rate in such jobs.  We computed the correlations between 
reported placement rates with temporary agencies and frequency of contacts with agencies, 
                                                 
6 Although contractors do not formally track temporary agency placements, their estimates are consistent 
with administrative data from earlier years.  The median survey response, 15 percent, compares with a mean of 21 
percent from the administrative data across all years and all contractors; rates of temporary employment were 
somewhat lower in more recent years in our data.     10
where the frequency is coded on a five-point scale with “never” being the lowest and “weekly” 
being the highest.   The correlations of temporary agency placement rates with frequency of 
temporary agency visits and with the frequency of referrals to temporary help agencies are 
positive, 0.29 and 0.53, respectively; the latter correlation is both large and significant.  
Contractor Views about Temporary Agencies and their Jobs 
Reflecting these differential rates of temporary agency placement, contractors differed in 
their assessments of the benefits and drawbacks of temporary agency jobs for participants.  
Contractors were asked whether their organization encouraged, discouraged, or took a neutral 
stance toward Work First participants taking such jobs.  They were then asked to explain this 
position.  A majority (13 of the 21) reported that their organization took a neutral stance toward 
temporary agency jobs; five contractors reported discouraging temporary agency jobs and three 
reported encouraging them.   
The reasons contractors gave for these differing stances are informative. All of those who 
discouraged temp agency jobs and most of those who took a neutral stance mentioned that 
temporary agency jobs tend to be temporary and generally do not lead to permanent positions.  
Among this group, two contractors indicated that they used temporary help jobs only as a last 
resort.  Even two of the three contractors who indicated that they encouraged agency positions 
qualified their answer by saying that they did so only in cases where the position was explicitly 
temp-to-hire or when direct-hire job options were poor.  Striking a more positive note, four 
contractors stated that temporary agency positions can provide useful experience and skills to 
those with little prior work experience.   
To obtain more systematic evidence of their views on temporary agencies, we asked 
contractors to rank temporary agency and direct-hire jobs on a series of characteristics, indicating   11
whether temporary agency jobs are generally better, direct-hire jobs are generally better, or the 
two are generally about the same.  The answers to this set of questions are reported in Table 2.  
Not surprisingly, a large majority of contractors (76 percent) viewed direct-hire jobs as superior 
to temporary agency jobs in terms of the duration or stability of the job.  A majority (57 percent) 
also viewed direct-hire jobs as better or about the same as temporary agency jobs in terms of pay 
and hours of work.  Sixty-two percent saw temporary agency jobs as better at accommodating 
clients’ needs for flexibility or scheduling work hours.  No consensus emerged as to the relative 
ranking of temporary agency and direct-hire jobs on transportation issues (i.e., the ease or 
difficulty of getting to the job), willingness to accommodate participants’ special issues, and 
treating participants well. 
Differentiating among Temporary Agencies: Are Some Better than Others? 
Many contractors have strong reservations about placing workers in jobs with agencies, 
particularly because the assignments tend to be short term and do not lead to longer-term jobs. 
Perhaps as a result, contractors that work with agencies in placing participants tend to work with 
selected agencies.  Sixteen of the 21 contractors indicated that their job developers work with 
particular agencies.  Among those who do not work with particular agencies, it is because they 
seldom or never work with temporary help agencies; no contractor reported that it was open to 
working with all types of agencies. Among those working with selected agencies, most reported 
working with agencies because of specific relationships or understandings they had developed 
with particular agencies, because the agency regularly provided temp-to-perm opportunities, or 
because the agency was “honest” about the nature and length of the assignment.  Three 
contractors stressed that they worked with agencies that have been successful at placing low-
skilled, difficult-to-place workers into jobs or at placing large groups of workers into jobs.    12
Among those who reported working with selected agencies, all reported having specific 
understandings with these agencies about the duration of job assignments and, wherever 
possible, that these assignments be temp-to-perm.   
Just as many contractors work primarily with selected agencies, many avoid working 
with certain agencies.  Eleven of 17 who work with agencies reported avoiding particular 
agencies because of bad experiences, primarily involving very short-term assignments.  Some 
contractors discouraged participants from taking assignments with day-laborer agencies, in 
which participants must report to the agency in the morning and are not guaranteed an 
assignment.  Four contractors stated that they avoid all or virtually all agencies.   
Differentiating among Work First Participants: Do Some Participants Do Better in Temporary 
Help Agency Jobs? 
 
While contractors differentiate among types of temporary help agencies, many also 
distinguish between types of participants when placing them into agency jobs.  Contractors were 
asked whether temporary agency positions were more or less difficult to obtain than direct-hire 
positions for those with relatively weak skills or experience and for those with relatively strong 
skills or experience: whether certain types of workers did better at temp agency jobs than at 
direct-hire jobs, and whether temp agency jobs were the only realistic alternative to 
unemployment for some.   
Few contractors believed that temporary agency jobs are harder than direct-hire jobs for 
their clients to obtain.  Over half viewed them as easier to obtain for those with weak skills or 
experience, while over a third viewed them as easier to obtain for those with strong skills or 
experience. About half of contractors (12 of 21) believed that certain participants do better in 
temporary agency jobs than in direct-hire jobs, and a third believed that those with weak skills or   13
experience do better working for temporary agencies.
7   A large minority (43 percent) expressed 
the view that temporary agency jobs were the only realistic alternative to unemployment for 
some.  Contractors holding the view that those with weak skills or experience benefit from 
temporary agency jobs, for the most part, coincided with those who believed that temporary 
agency jobs are easier than direct-hire jobs for these workers get, and indeed that such jobs may 
be the only alternative to unemployment for certain workers.   
When asked to elaborate on why they believed participants with weak skills and 
experience were better off in agency jobs, several of these contractors expressed the view that 
some clients simply are not ready to hold a permanent job and that agency jobs give them work 
experience and an understanding of employer expectations.  Others mentioned a valuable role 
that agencies can play in allowing these participants to sample different jobs and find a suitable 
match.  Agencies can provide participants contacts with many different employers and jobs.  
Moreover, if participants decide that they do not like a particular job, they can request a 
reassignment and avoid the stigma of a quit that would be recorded if they were in a direct-hire 
relationship. 
Long-Term Consequences of Temporary Agency Placements 
The question that is most relevant for welfare-to-work policy is whether temporary 
agency placements foster stable longer-term employment, ideally at wages that can support a 
family. The preceding discussion revealed a division among contractors who felt that certain 
groups, particularly low-skilled participants, benefited, and those who felt that agencies 
conferred no benefits or even harmed workers.  Contractor assessments about the long-term 
consequences of temporary agency placements, summarized in Table 3, reflect this division. 
                                                 
7 The contractors who cited others as benefiting from temporary agency positions were referring to those 
with particular skills, such as clerical or health care, where agencies could place them into temp-to-hire positions 
with good companies.   14
Contractors are most likely to feel that temporary agency placements help participants develop 
confidence (57 percent answered that they do so frequently or most of the time) and least likely 
to believe that temporary agency jobs result in temp-to-hire positions (76 percent answered 
rarely or occasionally).  However, most striking about Table 3 is the lack of consensus among 
contractors about these long-term effects.   
A majority of contractors (62 percent) believed that temporary agency placements can 
allow participants to avoid making a serious employment commitment, although there was 
considerable variation in contractors’ assessments of the prevalence of this problem.  Contractors 
pointed out that, even when the position is explicitly temporary, agency jobs allow participants to 
comply with the program’s work requirements.  Most contractors emphasized that many 
participants focus only on the short-term, and hence fail to fully appreciate that when they take a 
temporary agency job they are more likely to need to repeat the job search process in the near 
future.
8    
The Value of Temporary Agency Jobs: A Synthesis of the Contractors’ Conflicting Views 
Contractors vary widely in their policies and practices regarding the use of temporary 
agencies in welfare-to-work transitions.  Some avoid using temporary help agencies altogether.  
Others use them only in selected instances where the assignments are for reputable employers 
who are screening for permanent positions.  Others rely more extensively on temporary agencies 
for placing their clientele, especially those with weak skills and experience.    
There is little disagreement among contractors about the benefits of using temporary 
agencies in temp-to-hire situations.  However, when a company is screening for permanent 
employees through an agency, it is usually looking for workers whose skill levels would be at the 
                                                 
8 A couple of contractors noted that it is more difficult to monitor employment status in temporary agencies 
and that some, who do not want permanent employment, use  these jobs to give the appearance of complying with 
work requirements and hence game the system.     15
high end of the skill distribution of Work First participants. Contractors noted that workers with 
some marketable skill are relatively easy to place in either direct-hire or temporary agency 
positions. 
The real conundrum facing Work First providers concerns developing strategies for 
placing participants with very low skills, little or no work experience, or poor work ethics.  
Contractors are under considerable pressure to increase their job placement rates; typically, 40 to 
50 percent of Work First participants leave the program without finding a job.  As contractors 
readily pointed out, openings in direct-hire jobs for the least job-ready participants are often 
scant.  A majority believed it is easier for these low-skilled workers to find jobs with temporary 
agencies. 
Contractors sharply differed, however, in their views about whether those with weak 
skills and experience should be placed in agency jobs. On the one side, many believed that 
agency jobs can help these participants develop skills and a work ethic and that, for some 
participants, temporary employment is the only alternative to unemployment.  On the other side, 
some contractors only endorsed an agency job when it is a temp-to-hire position.  As expressed 
by one contractor, a temporary agency job “allows a person to stay compliant with Work First 
requirements, so they can’t be terminated from the program.  But, unless the job is temp-to-hire, 
they will end up back in the program.  It could be in six months, it could be a year later, but they 
will end up back in the program, in the same place.  They won’t have made any advances.”   
These divergent policies and practices are held by contractors who provide services to the 
same Work First population and operate in the same labor market.  Coupled with random 
assignment of participants among contractors, these different practices, which result in different 
placement rates into temporary agency, direct-hire, or no job, enable us to identify the labor   16
market effects of temporary agency placements.  We turn now to a formal examination of these 
effects, with a particular focus on whether temporary agency jobs increase the probability that an 
individual will leave welfare and escape poverty.   
V.  Do Temporary Help Agency Jobs Help Participants Escape Welfare and Poverty?  
Evidence from Administrative Data 
 
Methodology for Identifying Effects of Temporary Agency Employment 
We apply the methodology we developed in Autor and Houseman (2005) to examine 
whether temporary agency jobs help participants achieve income levels sufficient to leave 
welfare and escape poverty.  A key challenge for any empirical investigation of this sort is 
establishing causality.  Simple comparisons of subsequent employment and earnings outcomes 
among those obtaining direct-hire jobs, temporary agency jobs, or no job while in the Work First 
program may be misleading because the average characteristics of individuals taking a direct-
hire, a temporary agency, or no job differ.  Whereas those placed into both temporary agency and 
direct-hire jobs earn substantially more over the subsequent two-year period than those not 
placed in any job, they also have significantly higher education levels and significantly higher 
employment and earnings levels prior to Work First program entry (Autor and Houseman 2005).  
If there is significant selection on observable characteristics into job types (direct-hire, temp, or 
no job), it is likely that selection on unmeasured characteristics, such as motivation and 
employment barriers, is also important.  These confounding factors make it difficult to 
disentangle the effects of type of job taken (temporary help, direct hire, no job) on subsequent 
labor market outcomes from the determinants of the jobs taken initially. 
Several U.S. studies have endeavored to determine whether temporary agency jobs can 
facilitate the transition to employment among the low-skilled or low income unemployed and 
improve their longer-term employment and earnings outcomes (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane   17
2005; Heinrich, Muser, and Troske 2005; Corcoran and Chen 2004; Lane et al. 2003; Ferber and 
Waldfogel 1998). These studies, all based on non-experimental data and methodologies, all find 
some evidence that temporary agency employment improves longer-term labor market 
outcomes.
9  
Our study is the first to use a quasi-experimental research design.  As described above, in 
most geographic districts in our city, two or three contractors alternate in taking in new Work 
First participants.  Contractors operating within the same district, in turn, may have different 
policies and contacts that influence the fraction placed in jobs and, among those, the fraction 
placed in direct-hire and temporary agency jobs.  In Autor and Houseman (2005), we 
demonstrate that within nine geographic districts two critical assumptions that underlie our 
empirical strategy hold true.  First, participants assigned to contractors operating within the same 
geographic district were insignificantly different across a broad set of demographic 
characteristics and in their prior employment and earnings history, and thus the assignment of 
participants to contractors was consistent with random assignment. Second, there were large, 
persistent, and significant differences in the fraction of participants placed in temp, direct-hire, or 
no job across contractors operating in the same district.    
We exploit these cross-contractor differences in the probabilities of being placed in a 
direct-hire, temp, or no job among statistically identical populations living in the same 
neighborhood to identify the effects of a temporary agency placement, relative to a direct-hire or 
no job placement, on earnings outcomes over a two-year period following program entry.  We 
directly address the policy question of interest: Is placing workers in temporary agency jobs a 
viable strategy for moving additional low-skilled workers out of poverty?  It is critical to bear in 
                                                 
9 A number of studies of the role of temporary employment (temporary agency and fixed-term contract 
employment) in labor market transitions in Europe have been conducted.  For a description and critique of methods 
used in these U.S. and European studies, see Autor and Houseman (2005).     18
mind that the effect of a temporary agency job may not be the same for all individuals.  Indeed, 
our survey showed that contractors often distinguish between types of workers when assessing 
whether agency placements are beneficial.  Even if, on average, those who take an agency job 
derive long-term labor market benefits, it does not mean that a policy to increase placements 
with temporary help agencies will benefit the individuals impacted by the policy change, because 
the effects of temporary agency placements for the average temporary help worker may differ 
from the effects for the marginal temporary help worker.
10  
Our quasi-experimental research design allows us to measure the effects of marginal 
temporary agency placements.  That is, we identify whether a temporary agency placement, 
relative to no job placement or a direct-hire job placement, improves or harms labor market 
outcomes for those whose job placement status is impacted by contractor assignment.   
Descriptive Statistics on the Characteristics of Temporary Help Agency and Direct-Hire Jobs 
 
In our sample of Work First spells, 47 percent resulted in some job placement.  Among 
spells resulting in jobs, 21 percent were with temporary help agencies.  Figure 1 compares the 
occupational distribution of temporary agency and direct-hire jobs.  Temporary agency jobs were 
heavily concentrated in a subset of occupations.  Almost one-third of the agency jobs were in 
production occupations and 23 percent were in manual, general laborer positions.  Health care 
and clerical occupations each accounted for about 14 percent of agency jobs.  Direct-hire jobs 
were more dispersed across occupational categories.  The large differential between the fraction 
of temporary agency and direct-hire jobs in production occupations reflects the extensive use of 
temporary help agencies by manufacturers to staff low-skilled positions.
11 
                                                 
10 There is a large and growing literature on the heterogeneity of treatment effects.   See for example 
Angrist (2004) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).  
11 The occupational distribution of temporary agency jobs in our sample is broadly consistent with available 
national data from the Occupational Employment Survey.  According to the OES, production and clerical   19
Many contractors ranked temporary agency jobs less favorably than direct-hire jobs in 
terms of their wage levels and weekly hours.  Our administrative data, however, show that the 
mean hourly wage ($7.69 vs. $7.23) and weekly hours (37 vs. 34) – and in fact the entire 
distribution of wages and hours – are uniformly higher for temporary agency than for direct-hire 
jobs (Table 4).  This fact reflects, in part, the different occupational distribution of temporary 
agency and direct-hire jobs displayed in Figure 1.   
Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Temporary Agency Employment on Welfare Dependency 
and Poverty 
 
Descriptive evidence on the wages and hours of temporary agency jobs compared to 
direct-hire jobs suggests that the former are no worse—and possibly better—than the direct-hire 
jobs participants obtain. Though we caution that these simple comparisons should not be taken as 
causal, the evidence in Table 4 underscores that temporary agency positions may confer benefits, 
at least in the short run.  Whether over the longer term temporary agency jobs help the low-
skilled end welfare dependence and escape poverty depends on whether they help workers 
transition to stable employment.   
To formally examine this issue, we estimate the following econometric model: 
(1)  12 () icdt i i i d t d t idtc yT D X α β β λ γθγ θε ′ =+ + + + ++ × + , 
where  icdt y  is the outcome of interest for a participant in Work First spell i , with contractor c , in 
district d , and in program year t;  i D  and  i T  are dummy variables indicating the participant was 
placed in a direct-hire or temporary agency job, respectively;  i X  is a vector of characteristics 
including gender, race, age and age-squared, highest level of education achieved, and earnings in 
                                                                                                                                                             
occupations accounted for the greatest concentration of temporary agency jobs, each accounting for about a third of 
employment in 2000.  The relatively low concentration of clerical occupations in our sample no doubt reflects the 
low skills level of our population.  According to contractors surveyed, temporary clerical positions tend to require 
higher skill levels than most of their clientele have.     20
the four quarters prior to the quarter of Work First entry; γ  is a vector of district dummy 
variables, and θ  is a vector of quarter-year dummy variables.   
We first estimate this model using ordinary least squares and then follow with two-stage 
least squares estimates.  In the two-stage least squares model, we instrument for the indicator 
variables  i D  and  i T —that is, whether the participant obtained a direct-hire or temporary agency 
job—using contractor and contractor-program year dummy variables.  We report robust standard 
errors, allowing for clustering of the error term on contractor assignment by program year.
12 
As noted above, the effects of temporary agency or direct-hire jobs on the outcome of 
interest are estimated for individuals whose job placement type is changed by contractor 
assignment. In Autor and Houseman (2005) we show that, on the margin, those placed into 
temporary agency and direct-hire jobs have significantly weaker prior work histories than does 
the average worker placed into temporary agency and direct-hire positions. This finding makes 
sense; when contractors increase job placements, whether it be with direct-hire or temporary 
agency employers, they place participants who, on average, have weaker skills and experience 
than those initially placed.
13 Conceptually, then, our 2SLS estimates of  1 β  and  2 β  in Equation (1) 
indicate how a “marginal” worker among the Work First population—that is, an individual with 
relatively weak skills and experience—would fare over time if she were placed in a direct-hire 
job or a temporary agency job relative to no job at all.   
                                                 
12 The unit of observation is the Work First spell.  We do not correct for potential clustering of the error 
term for individuals with multiple spells in our data.  However, limiting the sample to the first spell yields virtually 
identical results to those reported here.   
13 This finding is also consistent with our survey results, which show that the debate among contractors 
over temporary help agencies pertains primarily to whether or not agency placements benefit or harm those with 
weaker skills and experience.  Thus, we would expect that the contractors with relatively high temporary agency 
placement rates would be placing relatively more participants with weak skills and experience into those agency 
jobs.  In turn, for the whole sample, we would expect marginal temporary agency workers to have, on average, 
weaker skills and experience.     21
Estimating equation (1), we show in earlier work that both direct-hire and temporary 
agency placements significantly increase participants’ employment and earnings relative to no 
job placement over the short-term—one quarter following the quarter of program entry.  
However, whereas direct-hire placements significantly increase participants’ employment and 
earnings for up to two years following program entry relative to no job placement, the positive 
labor market effects of temporary agency job placements are short-lived.  Two to eight quarters 
following program entry, temporary agency placements result in no increase in employment and 
earnings relative to no job placement; they also result in significantly lower employment rates 
and labor earnings relative to direct-hire job placements.   
We extend the analysis here to consider whether temporary agency placements help 
participants leave welfare and escape poverty – which is the ultimate goal of welfare policy and 
the Work First program in particular. We use several measures of welfare dependency and 
poverty to study this issue.  The first comes from the Work First administrative data.  When 
individuals leave the Work First program, the reason for program termination is coded.  One 
code indicates that the participant has obtained a job providing a stream of income sufficient to 
close her TANF case (“terminated because of earnings”).  This is the immediate and explicit goal 
of the program, so a case closed because of earnings is an indicator of program success.  About 
18 percent of Work First spells in our sample are terminated because of earnings.  Those who fail 
to find a job while in the program are terminated for other reasons, mostly because they fail to 
comply with program rules or refuse to continue.  Among those finding a job in the Work First 
program, about 38 percent with a direct-hire job and 33 percent with a temporary agency job 
achieve earnings levels sufficient to close their TANF case during their Work First spell.     22
We estimate Equation (1) with a dummy dependent variable indicating whether or not the 
participant achieved sufficient earnings during the spell to close her welfare case.
14  Selected 
coefficients from the OLS and Instrumental Variables (IV) models are reported in Table 5.  In 
the OLS models, the coefficients on the variables indicating the participant held a temporary 
agency (33.0) or direct-hire job (37.6) while in Work First reflect the percent in each category 
whose case was closed because of earnings. We stress that although these OLS models include 
controls for demographic characteristics and prior earnings, the results are purely descriptive.   
By contrast, the two-stage least squares models have a causal interpretation. Notably, the 
coefficient estimates in column 2 of Table 5 are both smaller than the OLS coefficients in 
column 1.  The coefficient on the direct-hire variable remains highly significant, however, and 
indicates that direct-hire placements increase the probability of successful program termination 
by 24.6 percentage points.  The coefficient estimate on the temporary agency variable (11.5), 
while still positive, is insignificantly different from zero.  The 2SLS models do not support the 
inference that temporary agency jobs significantly increase the probability of successful 
earnings-based case closure, though they do demonstrate that direct-hire job placements 
substantially increase this probability. 
Termination of TANF benefits as a result of a job obtained in the Work First program is 
highly relevant to contractors because they are evaluated on this measure.  From a broader policy 
perspective, however, this measure has potential flaws.  First, those who do not find a job while 
in the Work First program may find employment on their own and leave welfare, yet they are not 
counted as “successes” by this measure.  Second, individuals who are terminated because of 
                                                 
14 Information on the reason for case closure was missing for 1,595 spells, and these observations were 
dropped from the sample.   23
earnings may lose their job and end up back on welfare benefits and in Work First in a relatively 
short period of time.   
To surmount these limitations, we examine measures that indicate whether, over longer 
time horizons, participants achieved earnings sufficient to end welfare dependency and escape 
poverty.  Because we cannot compute individual-level welfare and poverty thresholds with our 
data (since they do not include information on family composition), we select a variety of 
welfare and poverty thresholds as outcome measures: earnings needed to terminate welfare 
benefits for a family of three and for a family of four (typically a mother with two or three 
dependent children) and earnings exceeding the poverty level for a family of three with two 
dependent children or a family of four with three dependent children.
15 
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the percent of Work First participants with 
earnings above these thresholds over various time horizons for those obtaining a direct-hire, 
temporary agency, or no job while in the program.  The income threshold for welfare benefits is 
considerably below the poverty level for any given family size.  The income level above which a 
family’s welfare benefits would be cut was 64 percent of the poverty level for a family of three 
with two dependent children and 59 percent for a family of four with three dependent children in 
2003.
16   
Relatively few participants attain earnings even above the lowest threshold.  For instance, 
in the first four quarters following program entry, the percent with earnings exceeding the 
welfare threshold level for a family of three, $9,504 in annual earnings, was 9.1 percent for those 
                                                 
15 Welfare thresholds change infrequently.  Therefore, to assess whether a participant’s earnings exceeded a 
threshold, we compared unadjusted earnings to the welfare threshold applying during the time period.  For poverty 
thresholds, we used 2003 Census Bureau definitions, which are defined only at the national level, and adjusted both 
earnings and poverty thresholds for inflation to 2003 levels using the Consumer Price Index. 
16 Those not eligible for TANF may still be eligible for Food Stamps, other assistance, and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, and thus the discrepancy between welfare and poverty thresholds may be smaller once these 
benefits are taken into account.   24
with no job in Work First, 22.1 percent for those with a direct-hire job, and 21.3 percent for those 
with a temporary agency job.  The fraction earning above the poverty threshold for a family of 
four with three dependent children in the first year following the quarter of program entry is 5 
percent or less for all groups.  
Paralleling the analysis reported in Table 5, we use Equation (1) to estimate a series of 
models with dummy-dependent variables indicating earnings above each of the four thresholds 
over the various time horizons.  The first panel of Table 7 reports coefficient estimates pertaining 
to the welfare and poverty thresholds for the first quarter following program entry; the second 
panel for the second through fourth quarters following program entry; the third panel for the 
combined first through fourth quarters; and the last panel for the fifth through eighth quarters 
following the quarter of program entry. 
Our 2SLS estimates of the effects of job placement on short-term earnings are generally 
similar to the OLS estimates.  The 2SLS models indicate that for three out of the four thresholds, 
temporary agency placements significantly raise the probability (relative to no job placement) 
that participants’ earnings will exceed the welfare or poverty threshold in the near term – that is, 
the first quarter following program entry.  
The IV models also indicate that, relative to no job placement, direct-hire placements 
significantly increase the probability that participants’ earnings in the first quarter exceed the two 
welfare thresholds.  From Table 7, column 4, for instance, we estimate that a temporary agency 
placement increases by 14.8 percentage points the probability that a participant’s earnings in the 
first quarter following the quarter of entry will exceed the welfare threshold for a family of four, 
whereas a direct-hire placement increases that probability by 9.6 percentage points.   25
Results from our IV models portray a distinctly different picture when we evaluate the 
effects of job placements on earnings over a longer time horizon.  Direct-hire placements 
significantly raise the probability that participant earnings will exceed the income level necessary 
for a family of three or four to remain off of welfare for up to two years following the quarter of 
program entry.  Relative to no job placement, placing an individual in a direct-hire job increases 
the likelihood that her earnings will exceed the welfare threshold for a family of four by 5.9 
percentage points over the first year following the quarter of program entry and by 10.8 
percentage points for the second year following the quarter of program entry.   
In contrast, the initial positive effects of temporary agency placements disappear over 
longer time horizons.  Over the first and the second year following program entry, the IV 
estimates of the effects of temporary agency placements on the probability of earning above 
welfare thresholds are negative, though small and insignificantly different from zero.  Thus, 
marginal temporary agency placements do not appear to help participants stay off of welfare.   
For higher thresholds, as represented by the poverty threshold for a family of three and 
for a family of four, we find that neither temporary agency nor direct-hire placements help 
participants escape poverty over a one-to-two-year period following program entry.  In fact, 
relative to no job and to a direct-hire job placement, placements into temporary agency jobs 
actually have modest but significant negative effects on the probability that participants earn 
above the poverty threshold for a family of four over the four quarters following program entry.   
In summary, we find that placements in temporary agency jobs help participants escape 
welfare and poverty only in the short term.  Over longer horizons, these placements do not 
increase, and may even reduce, participants’ chances of attaining earnings levels sufficient to 
leave welfare and escape poverty.  In contrast, placements in direct-hire jobs modestly increase   26
the chances that participants will earn enough to leave welfare, though we find no significant 
effects of marginal direct-hire jobs on the probability of exceeding poverty thresholds.  
VI.  Policy Implications 
In contrast to previous studies, we find no evidence that would support a policy 
recommendation that employment programs should increase the use of temporary agencies as 
labor market intermediaries for low-skilled workers.  Although temporary agency job placements 
do raise the probability that Work First participants will earn above welfare and poverty 
thresholds over very short time horizons, these positive effects quickly dissipate.  Over horizons 
of one to two years, placements in temporary agency jobs (relative to no job placement) do not 
increase the chances that participants will earn enough to leave welfare and escape poverty. 
Moreover, by some measures, these placements reduce the chances that earnings will exceed 
poverty thresholds.  Our results suggest raising direct-hire placements are likely to be a much 
more effective means for job assistance programs to reduce welfare dependency over both the 
short and long term. Even marginal direct-hire placements, however, do not appear to improve 
participants’ chances of escaping poverty over longer time horizons. 
It must be emphasized that our results do not imply that temporary agency jobs never 
improve long-term participant outcomes.  Our estimates pertain only to “marginal” workers—
that is, to participants whose job placement is affected by random assignment among contractors.  
As we show in Autor and Houseman (2005), these marginal temporary help agency and direct-
hire workers have weaker skills and experience than the average participant placed into a job.  
To the degree that there is heterogeneity among temporary agency jobs or workers, the effects of   27
temporary agency placements may differ between the marginal and infra-marginal placement.
17  
Our survey evidence, for instance, revealed some consensus among contractors that temp-to-
perm jobs, which tend to be taken by relatively high-skilled participants, are often beneficial – 
but we cannot formally test this proposition with our data. Nevertheless, our findings are 
particularly germane to the design of welfare programs. The operative question for program 
design is whether job programs assisting welfare and other low-wage workers can improve 
participants’ labor market outcomes by placing more clients with temporary agency positions. 
Our analysis suggests not. 
Among marginal temporary help workers (i.e., those with relatively weak skills and 
experience), why do agency jobs fail to provide lasting benefits and potentially even harm 
participants’ long-term labor market outcomes?  Although we cannot provide definitive answers 
to this critical question, our survey evidence and statistical analysis suggest some plausible 
explanations. Work First contractors reported that temporary agency jobs were relatively more 
plentiful than direct-hire jobs for those with weak skills and experience, but that these agency 
jobs generally did not lead to permanent positions.  Reinforcing these perceptions, Autor and 
Houseman (2005) estimate that temporary agency placements subsequently result in increased 
earnings in the temporary help sector but also in reduced earnings in direct-hire jobs. Thus, those 
placed in temporary agency jobs are more likely than average participants to continue to work in 
the temporary help sector.  To the extent that these temporary jobs lead to shorter job durations 
and more frequent unemployment spells, they may generate lower earnings and lesser 
employment stability over the long term than direct-hire jobs. Lending some weight to this 
concern, two-stage least squares estimates in Autor and Houseman (2005) indicate that 
                                                 
17 Heterogeneity of effects between marginal and infra-marginal workers may partly explain the differences 
of our results from those of previous studies.  For an extensive discussion of this issue, see Autor and Houseman 
(2005).   28
participants placed in temporary help jobs during their Work First spell are significantly more 
likely to experience another spell of welfare receipt within two years than are participants placed 
in direct-hire jobs. 
One perspective expressed in our contractor survey was that a certain segment of the 
temporary agency market accommodated individuals with very weak skills, experience, and 
work ethic by providing them with jobs that require few skills and no long-term commitment.  
Yet it is the lack of skills, experience, and work ethic that keeps these individuals in poverty.  
While temporary agency positions may help these individuals to fulfill program work 
requirements in the short term, these appear ineffective at reducing their dependency on welfare.  
Job placements that might help participants to overcome, rather than accommodate, their 
employment barriers may be more beneficial.   
We conclude that in some circumstances it would be better for individuals to pass up an 
opportunity to work for a temporary agency and to continue to search for direct-hire 
employment.  Yet, the incentives built into the Work First program for both participants and 
contractors may not support such a decision.  Participants are encouraged to obtain work quickly 
and officially are required to accept any employment offering the minimum wage and sufficient 
hours.  Contractors are primarily evaluated on job placement rates and 90-day retention rates, 
and over such short time horizons temporary agency placements do yield benefits.  Moving to an 
incentive structure that places greater weight on longer-term outcomes may reduce welfare 
dependence and poverty levels by mitigating short-term pressures on program providers to place 
participants into any job available, including potentially counter-productive ones.   
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Table 1.  Frequency of Temp Agency Visits and Referrals to Agencies 
   (percent of contractors reporting frequency) 
 Weekly  Monthly 
Every few 
months Sporadically  Never 
          
Invite temp agencies on-site  4.8  9.5  19.1  38.1  28.6 
          
Refer participants to jobs at temp agencies  23.8  33.3  4.8  28.6  9.5 
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Table 2.  Comparison of the Characteristics of Temp Agency and Direct-Hire Jobs: Contractors’ Views 
   (percent reporting) 
  Direct-hire better  Temp better  Same  Don’t know 
      
Hours per week  57.1  0.0  23.8  19.1 
      
Hourly  pay  57.1  9.5 19.1 14.3 
      
Job stability/duration  76.2  4.8  9.5  9.5 
      
Transportation issues
a  20.0 15.0 45.0 20.0 
      
Accommodate clients' needs for 
flexibility or scheduling work 
hours 
19.1 61.9 14.3  4.8 
      
Willingness to accommodate 
participants' special issues 
19.1 23.8 42.9 14.3 
      
Treat participants well  23.8  14.3  47.6  14.3 
      
Tabulations based on survey responses from 21 Work First contractors. 
aTabulations based on 20 responses. 
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Table 3.  Longer-Term Consequences of Temp Help Jobs 
   (percent responding) 
 Rarely  Occasionally Frequently 
Most of the 
time 
      
Help participants build skills  23.8  28.6  38.1  9.5 
      
Help participants improve work habits  33.3  23.8  33.3  9.5 
      
Help participants develop confidence  19.1  23.8  42.9  14.3 
      
Generate contacts that may lead to other jobs  19.1  33.3  28.6  19.1 
      
Result in temp-to-hire positions  33.3  42.9  19.1  4.8 
      
Prevent participants from searching for better, possibly 
direct-hire, jobs 
47.6 9.5  33.3 9.5 
      
Allow participants to avoid making a serious 
employment commitment 
38.1 19.1 23.8 19.1 
      
Tabulations based on survey responses from 21 Work First contractors. 
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(std. error)  10th 50th 90th  N 
       
Hourly wages ($)       
       
Temp 7.69  5.75  7.00  10.00  3,286 
 (0.03)         
          
Direct-hire 7.23  5.15  7.00  9.50  13,709 
  ( 0 . 0 2 )       
        
Weekly hours        
        
Temp  37.01  30 40 40  3,286 
  ( 0 . 1 0 )       
        
Direct-hire  33.54  20 35 40  13,709 
  ( 0 . 0 6 )       
        
Weekly earnings ($)        
        
Temp  284.38  200 280 400  3,286 
  ( 1 . 4 3 )       
        
Direct-hire  245.78  140 240 360  13,709 
  ( 0 . 8 0 )       
       
Wages and earnings data were inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
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Table 5.  The Effect of Work First Job Placements on the Probability of Having Welfare Case Closed due to 
Earnings 
  
Percent of cases closed 
because of earnings  OLS 2SLS 
        
Temp agency job    32.9  33.0**  11.5 
     (1.8)  (11.1) 
        
Direct-hire job    37.6  37.6**  24.6** 
     (1.4)  (7.1) 
        
R
2     0.24  0.20 
        
H0: Temp = Direct      0.00  0.41 
        
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. Number of observations = 
34,510. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment × year.  All models 
include year × quarter of assignment and randomization-district × year of assignment dummy variables, and 
controls for age and its square, race, sum of UI earnings in four quarters prior to Work First assignment, and four 
education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and education unknown). 
Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 6.  Percent with Earnings Sufficient to Escape Welfare or Poverty, by Time from Work First Orientation and 
by Job Type, Various Thresholds 
 
Welfare threshold, 
family of 3 
Welfare threshold, 
family of 4 
Poverty threshold, 
family of 3 
Poverty threshold, 
family of 4 
 Quarter  1 
No job  6.7  5.4  3.4  2.1 
Direct-hire job  21.3  17.0  9.9  5.2 
Temp job  21.1  16.4  9.7  5.2 
        
 Quarters  1-4 
        
No job  9.1  7.1  4.2  2.2 
Direct-hire job  22.1  17.5  10.0  5.3 
Temp job  21.3  17.1  9.5  5.4 
        
 Quarters  5-8 
        
No job  12.2  10.1  8.8  5.1 
Direct-hire job  19.8  16.5  15.0  8.5 
Temp job  19.3  16.0  14.5  8.9 
        
Number of observations = 36,105 in panels labeled Quarter 1 and Quarters 1-4 and represent Work First participants 
entering from third quarter 1999 through second quarter 2003. The last panel labeled Quarters 5-8 is based on 
participants entering from the third quarter of 1999 through the second quarter of 2002 and has 25,118 observations.
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Table 7.  The Effect of Work First Job Placements on the Probability of Escaping Poverty One to Eight Quarters 
Following Work First Assignment 
 
Welfare threshold, 
family of 3   
Welfare threshold, 
family of 4   
Poverty threshold, 
family of 3 
Poverty threshold, 
family of 4 
   OLS   2SLS    OLS  2SLS    OLS  2SLS   OLS   2SLS 
   (1)   (2)     (3)  (4)     (5)  (6)   (7)  (8) 
 First  Quarter 
Temp agency job    12.4**    17.6**     9.2**  14.8**  5.0**  8.8**   2.2**   2.9 
    (0.9)    (4.3)     (0.8)  (3.6)   (0.6)  (2.2)   (0.4)  (1.9) 
Direct-hire job    13.3**    12.2**      10.3** 9.6**   5.5**  0.7   2.4**  -0.6 
    (0.5)    (2.1)     (0.4)  (2.1)   (0.3)  (1.4)   (0.2)  (1.1) 
R
2    0.11         0.11     0.09     0.07    
H0: Temp = Direct    0.41    0.26     0.22  0.26   0.42  0.01   0.67  0.17 
  Quarters 1 - 4 
Temp  agency  job    9.8**    -0.3     7.8**  -0.9   3.7**  -1.0   2.3**  -4.1* 
    (0.9)    (5.8)     (0.8)  (4.4)   (0.5)  (3.0)   (0.4)  (2.1) 
Direct-hire job    11.1**    6.7**      8.7**  5.9**   4.6**  0.7   2.3**  2.5* 
    (0.4)    (3.2)     (0.4)  (2.6)   (0.3)  (1.3)   (0.2)  (1.3) 
R
2    0.14         0.13     0.10     0.08    
H0: Temp = Direct    0.16    0.35     0.30  0.24   0.16  0.61   0.88  0.01 
  Quarters 5 - 8 
Temp  agency  job    6.8**    -4.5     5.6**  -2.77   3.7**  -5.8   2.2**  -3.5 
    (1.0)    (6.7)     (0.9)  (6.7)   (0.7)  (5.5)   (0.5)  (4.5) 
Direct-hire job    8.3**    15.1**      7.0**  10.8**  4.5**  6.3   2.2**   3.4 
    (0.6)    (4.9)     (0.5)  (4.8)   (0.4)  (4.4)   (0.3)  (3.2) 
R
2    0.12         0.12       0.11     0.09    
H0: Temp = Direct    0.20    0.05       0.17   0.17     0.36  0.11    0.92    0.25 
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level; * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. Number of observations = 
36,105 in panels labeled Quarter 1 and Quarters 1-4 and represent Work First participants entering from third 
quarter 1999 through second quarter 2003.  The last panel labeled Quarters 5-8 is based on participants 
entering from the third quarter 1999 through the second quarter of 2002 and has 25,118 observations. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses are clustered on Work First contractor assignment × year.  All models include 
year × quarter of assignment and randomization district × year of assignment dummy variables, and controls 
for age and its square, race, sum of UI earnings in four quarters prior to Work First assignment, and four 
education dummies (elementary education, less than high school, greater than high school, and education 
unknown). Coefficient estimates and standard errors are multiplied by 100.   
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